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Abstract 
In this paper we argue that the so-called 'positivism'-versus-'interpretivism' conflict raised by some constructivist, 
postmodernist, relativist philosophers and methodologists in information systems research is merely a pseudo 
problem which has no basis in reality. This pseudo problem of so-called 'positivism' versus 'interpretivism' only 
distracts from the genuine problem of the information systems discipline, namely the design and construction of 
reliable devices from reasonable specifications, for well-defined purposes, on the basis of scientifically 
acceptable principles. In contrast to those relativist 'philosophies' we show that information systems research 
actually belongs to the domain of engineering which already has its time-tested methodology and epistemology, 
including a trinity of scientific-nomothetic, hermeneutic-idiographic, as well as pragmatic-normative elements. 
By accepting fact that information systems research is a specific instance of engineering research, which also 
includes (and has always included) the un-quantifiable 'human dimension', a number of fruitless debates can be 
terminated for the sake of genuine progress in information systems' theory, design and deployment. 
Keywords 
Information systems research as engineering research, Philosophy and methodology of engineering. 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
"The motor-car of today is the result of all the objections that were made against the motor-car of 1910"              
– José Ortega y Gasset, 1930. 
"Informatics must become a field of exceptional character at a new abstract level; the graduate of this 
curriculum must be a scientist of a class which has not existed until now: he must be an engineer by education 
and by mentality, but he must construct abstract objects which so far had been studied by mathematicians only. 
Mathematicians, however, study abstract objects for quite different purposes and in a different frame of mind"    
– Heinz Zemanek, 1972. 
Definitions 
An information system is a hybrid human/task/technics-system for the acquisition, production, storage and usage 
of information (including communication) for the purpose of satisfying some users' information demand 
(Heinrich 1999). Thereby, information is understood as action-guiding knowledge about past, present or future 
states of reality, or events in reality, particularly in the context of commercial enterprises or administrative 
organisations (Heinrich 1999); the concept of information in this field is thus strongly related to the world of 
human life and must therefore not be conflated with the abstract technical notion of information (quantified in 
the unit of Bit) as in Shannon's mathematical information theory. Human is understood specifically as the bearer 
of some task within such an organisation (Heinrich 1999). Task is understood as one of the organisational or 
business processes to be supported by such an information system (Heinrich 1999). Technics (not to be confused 
with technology) is understood as the means, methods and devices by which such a system is materially 
implemented (Heinrich 1999). Examples of information systems cover a wide spectrum of possibilities, ranging 
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from simple data bases installed in isolation on an individual computer to enterprise-wide network systems such 
as the company Oracle's PeopleSoft system, also artificial-intelligence-supported expert systems, etc. A finer 
classification of the various types of information systems can be found in (Heinrich 1999), too. 
Information systems research is thus the (partly academic, partly industrial) discipline about how to conceive, to 
design, and to implement information systems in the best possible manner, concerning qualities such as 
availability, usability, efficiency, and the like (Heinrich et al. 1999). Thereby, to the extent that information 
systems are technically implemented as software systems, software engineering –which has its own science-
philosophical and methodological problems itself (Gruner 2010; Gruner 2011; Northover et al. 2008)– can be 
regarded as one part of information systems research. To the extent that information systems, as defined above, 
find their specific place in socio-economic environments, questions related to the human disciplines of 
psychology, sociology, cultural geography and economics must also be taken into consideration by the discipline 
of information systems research (Heinrich et al. 1999). 
What we have here called 'information systems research' is by-and-large the same as what is elsewhere called 
'business informatics' (Heinrich et al. 1999). Accordingly, business informatics studies information systems and 
information infrastructures in business enterprises and administrative organisations. Moreover, business 
informatics attempts at explaining such systems by means of developing a theory of information systems with 
the goal of being able to forecast their behaviour (Heinrich et al. 1999). Due to its above-mentioned cross-
disciplinary character business informatics has also been classified as a so-called 'integration discipline' 
(Heinrich et al. 1999), from which a number of science-methodological problems arise. Though by-and-large 
classifiable as 'real' science (empirical), it also contains elements of a 'formal' science (rational-mathematical) 
(Heinrich et al. 1999). Though embedded into the social- and economy-sciences, strong influences upon business 
informatics from the field of engineering may not be ignored (Heinrich et al. 1999). From a methodological 
point of view, this twofold heritage results in a peculiar mixture of sociological and engineering research 
methods (Heinrich et al. 1999). This combination also characterises the discipline as an 'applied' science, in 
contrast to a 'pure' science (such as, for example, theoretical astrophysics). As far as information systems rely on 
abstract models of socio-economical realities, on the basis of which an information system's data bases are 
structured and organised (Heinrich 1999), many science-philosophical questions and problems concerning 
models and modelling (Kreisel 1980; Stachowiak 1994) are relevant in and for business informatics as well. An 
overview of the historical development of the field of information systems research is given in (Hirschheim et al. 
2012). 
The discipline of IS often also identified as 'information technology' (IT) in the broadest sense. Such popular 
conflation of terms is (strictly speaking) wrong, because 'information technology' is (strictly speaking) a branch 
of electrical and electronic engineering – namely the branch that provides the physical knowledge and electrical 
apparatus for signal transmission (including network infrastructures, high-frequency antennae, etc.) and data 
storage devices (which are simply taken for granted at the level of information systems research). This notion of 
'information technology' emerged as the accepted standard notion out of a conceptual quarrel between business 
managers and engineers during the third quarter of the 20th century (Kline 2006). 
In summary: Information systems (IS) are socio-technical systems involving computer applications with software 
specifically in the domain of commercial enterprises or public administration. Information systems research, 
elsewhere also called business informatics, is the hybrid, socio-technical, academic and industrial discipline 
concerned with the theory and practice as well as the design, construction and deployment of information 
systems. Information systems research and information technology, though often conflated in colloquial 
language, are (strictly speaking) not the same. When we refer to 'information systems research' (IS research) in 
the remainder of this paper, it is this hybrid discipline which we have in mind. 
Practical Problems with IS Projects 
Over the past two decades the success rate of information systems projects has fluctuated between 30% and 
50%, measured by various metrics and authorities (Marnewick 2012). Those success rate figures remained low 
over long periods of time, despite the effort spent on researching better development methods and finding risk 
factors for project failure. Similar project failure rates have often been reported in other branches of software 
engineering, too, which are related to IS research and development (as outlined above). Because of the 'dual 
nature' of the IS discipline it is difficult to pin-point a centre of responsibility (the software engineering part, or 
the part of socio-economics) in the case of project failures in this domain. Failure analysis, in such settings, is 
not an easy task. 
Science-Philosophical Quarrels 'behind' the Discipline of IS 
Whilst numerous IS projects are ailing and failing in practice, numerous philosophically minded members of the 
IS community are engaged in ideologically charged methodology-fights and quarrels or 'paradigm wars' (Gruner 
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2008) about the correct scientific method for the IS discipline. Unlike in the field of software engineering, in 
which science-philosophical meta discourses are comparatively sparse (Gruner 2010; Gruner 2011; Northover et 
al. 2008), the science-philosophical and research-methodological meta discourses about IS research are very 
dense: see for example the annual GTM series of the International Workshop on Grounded Theory Methods in 
Information Systems Research. It seems plausible that IS researchers have 'inherited' those meta-theoretical 
discourses from their sociological tradition in which socio-philosophical and science-methodological reflections 
are known since the days of Auguste Comte. Those discourses climaxed in the rather fruitless Positivismusstreit 
of German sociology between the School of Frankfurt and the Critical Rationalists in the third quarter of the 20th 
century (Adorno et al. 1972). Nowadays a considerable number of meta-theorists of IS research (unlike 'typical' 
software engineers) are apparently still influenced by various ideas and notions related to the obsolete 
Positivismusstreit of German sociology. However, whereas the original Positivismusstreit had been fought 
between two profoundly modern philosophical groups, in the IS 'version 2.0' of Positivismusstreit the so-called 
'positivists' appear now in opposition against post-modern ideologies such as socio-constructivism, the so-called 
'interpretivism', or other types of relativism: see (Gregg et al. 2001) for comparison – an IS paper which was, 
unfortunately, also characterised by a gross misunderstanding of what is 'software engineering' in IS, because it 
did not properly capture the engineering in 'software engineering'. Generally it can be said that methodological 
fights between different 'philosophies' or 'schools' are often (though not always) indicative of the 'youth' or 'pre-
paradigmatic immaturity' of an emerging scholarly discipline. 
Our Position and Contribution 
From a historic perspective we note that positivism was a phenomenon of the 19th century and does not exist 
nowadays any more. Already the Viennese Circle in the first half of the 20th century was no longer positivist: its 
philosophers were neo-positivists, with some important differences between them and the ideology of the 19th 
century. After the collapse of the Viennese Circle in sad historic circumstances, neo-positivism strongly declined 
as well. With genuine positivists no longer existing in reality, the historically wrong and defamatory misuse of 
the word 'positivist' by members of the School of Frankfurt, for the purpose of ad-hominem attacks against their 
philosophical opponents, was one of the ugliest characteristics of the notorious Positivismusstreit in German 
sociology (Adorno et al. 1972). Because those ideologically charged ad-hominem allegations of 'positivism' were 
historically outdated and had no basis in reality, the Positivismusstreit ended, all-in-all, rather fruitlessly. For this 
reason we argue that the same old quarrel should better not be continued almost half a century later in the 
contemporary discipline of IS. 
Moreover we conjecture that those two issues with contemporary IS research, namely the high failure rates in 
practical projects and the widespread anti-'positivist' ideology, are non-arbitrarily linked with each other: see for 
comparison (Snelting 1998), in which an attitude of 'Feyerabendian' relativism in software engineering –also 
troubled by notorious project failure rates in practice– had been criticized. 
After some recapitulation of related work, in which earlier authors have already brought forward their own 
critique against relativism in IS or other disciplines, we provide several examples of the factual existence of 
relativism and anti-scientific ideology in the philosophical meta-theory about IS research. Thereafter we, too, 
criticise such relativist ideology whereby we argue that the proponents and followers of such ideology 
deliberately exclude themselves from the community of engineers to which also the discipline of IS belongs. To 
offer a viable exit out of the fruitless 'positivism-versus-interpretivism' quarrel in the IS meta-theory, we briefly 
sketch the main features of a philosophy and methodology of engineering on the basis of Vincenti, and we 
conclude that none other than such a type of philosophy is needed to make the IS discipline both science-
philosophically sound as well as practically trustworthy and reliable. As a consequence –in the spirit of Ortega y 
Gasset's above-quoted aphorism (Ortega 1930)– the information systems deployed tomorrow will be the results 
of all the objections made against the information systems deployed today. 
RELATED WORK 
The vexing diversity of opinions about reality was the starting point of Socrates' and Plato's philosophising more 
than 2400 years ago. From their observation of such diversity of opinions, however, Socrates and Plato did not 
jump to the conclusion that there would have to exist a manifold of realities. Instead, they distinguished 
conceptually between 'mere opinions' and 'genuine knowledge', and they started a quest for finding genuine 
knowledge, beyond mere opinions, about reality. Relativists, on the contrary, have jumped to the conclusion that 
the observable multiplicity of opinions about reality would confirm the existence of a multiplicity of realities as 
such. This, however, is merely a linguistic confusion in which the meanings of the terms 'reality' and 'opinion 
about reality' have been conflated. 
A strong, discipline-independent critique of relativism has been provided in (Neville 1981) on the basis of 
linguistic considerations: Part of the purpose of a public proposal is that, when grasped from the perspective of 
all the evidence, it will be 'evident' to all inquirers that the subject matter is as proposed. Not to make it 
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potentially accessible is to say that the proposal is 'true for those in privileged position X'. This, however, is to 
change the subject matter of the proposed hypothesis. For 'true for those in privileged position X' means: 'Those 
in privileged position X consider the proposal true'. The latter clause is not about the subject matter but about 
those in the privileged position. It is one thing to note that some inquirers do not have access to the evidence: In 
this case the proposal cannot be asserted as completely true, but only potentially true. It is another thing to 
assert the proposal to be true for those in a privileged position: This is to change the subject covertly (Neville 
1981). Further consideration along these lines lead to the insight that stating the theory that truth claims are 
specific to languages or to traditions presuppose a theory of reference and truth contradicted by the theory 
asserted (Neville 1981). In other words: cultural relativism is ultimately inconsistent from a logical point of 
view. 
If the producers of faulty IS installations must appear before a court of justice in case that their product has 
caused material damage or human injury, they can only defend themselves against their prosecutors by appealing 
to objective principles. In such cases only hard evidence can be admitted to a legal hearing before a jury or judge 
can speak out a legally acceptable sentence. On the basis of a number of common features between IS research 
and Digital Forensics research the following considerations are noteworthy. Forensic methods have occasionally 
failed those who were wrongfully convicted on the basis of low-quality evidence. In the past, the absence of strict 
scientific standards in some forensic practices has caused confusion about the reliability, validity, repeatability 
and accuracy of the outcomes, especially when the outcomes are presented in court, where the intended 
audience did not have the technical knowledge to judge the reliability of the presented evidence. Digital forensic 
scientists and practitioners have a duty to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past by scrutinizing the scientific 
maturity of their field, and by approaching and conveying evidence accordingly (Olivier et al. 2013). In such 
cases we can see clearly how strongly the trust in public justice depends on the trust in the objectivity of science. 
Such trust, however, is earned through the successful repeatability of processes, which render consistent, 
accurate, reliable and valid outcomes (Olivier et al. 2013). Relativism in such matters would undermine this 
public trust in justice. 
Similar to the 'positivism-versus-interpretivism' quarrel in the meta-theory of IS, there had been strong resistance 
against the scientification of engineering during the 19th century (Baber 1997). Software engineering, to which 
the discipline of IS is closely related, is nowadays in a similar situation as classical engineering had been in the 
19th century: software engneering's scientification is imminent, too, albeit –again– against considerable 
resistance from particular groups of antagonists within the discipline. The transition requires that a suitable 
culture must be built on and around that technical and scientific basis. Such a culture will be characterized by 
an engineering mentality, an explicitly felt sense of responsibility on the part of individual practitioners, and 
commonly employed procedures intended to ensure that human errors do not prevent the potential for error-free 
designs from being realized. Systematic and reproducible approaches to the verification of designs must be 
taken. Designs will be independently reviewed against their specifications as well as against other commonly 
accepted criteria (Baber 1997). 
A wide gap between theory and practice with severe consequences in the IS-related discipline of software 
engineering had been attributed in (Snelting 1998) to an attitude of socio-constructivism,2 a variant of relativism 
according to which objective truths are merely social constructs, amongst members of the software engineering 
community. In that context it was criticized that a large number of papers published in software engineering 
contained merely 'ideas' without any work towards their empirical validation, upon which it was requested that 
software engineering should begin to accept the quality standards appropriate to the empirical sciences. 
According to (Snelting 1998) the shortcomings of constructivism can be revealed logically by applying 
constructivist ideas onto the theory of constructivism itself (Snelting 1998), similar to the language-logical 
argument of (Neville 1981). 
Because a number of IS researchers seem to put themselves into the same academic category as sociologists or 
anthropologists, (Orlikowski et al. 2001) started with the observation that the field of information systems (IS), 
which is premised on the centrality of information technology in everyday life, has not deeply engaged its core 
subject matter, the information technology (IT) artefact. Instead, IS researchers tend to focus their theoretical 
attention elsewhere, for example, on the context within which some usually unspecified technology is seen to 
operate (Orlikowski et al. 2001). All in all, (Orlikowski et al. 2001) provides an argument against the anti-
engineering attitude of sociologism in IS, which we criticise in our paper, too. 
Compatible with a philosophy of engineering for IS, in favour of which we wrote this paper, (Lee et al. 2009) 
have argued that 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' research are both valid ways of conducting scientific research in 
IS, if and as long as they both fit into a unified framework of logical reasoning, because in such a framework it 
2 This is not to be confused with constructivism in mathematics, whereby general existence proofs are not accepted when 
carried out non-constructively by means of the reductio-ad-absurdum method without any confirming examples. 
                                                 
25th Australasian Conference on Information Systems Shortage of Engineering in Recent IS Research 
8th -10th Dec 2014, Auckland, New Zealand Gruner & Kroeze  
is possible to formally express the falsification of hypotheses. Moreover (Lee et al. 2009) distinguished between 
'formative' validity (for ongoing research programmes) and 'summative' validity (for the results thereof), again 
for both quantitative and non-quantitative research methods, whereby 'summative' validity is connected with 
systematic tests or experiments. A few years later, this concept of 'summative validity' in IS research also found 
its way into the methodological considerations of (Wynn et al. 2012). 
The related work samples recapitulated in this section should be regarded as the proverbial 'smoke', which 
indicates the occurrence of a 'fire'. A few 'flames' of this 'fire' shall be shown in the subsequent section. 
SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF RELATIVISM AND SOCIOLOGISM IN THE DISCIPLINE OF IS 
Due to page restrictions we cannot discuss in this paper all the subtle variants and variations in the meanings of 
the terms 'relativism' and 'sociologism'. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to understand these terms 
broadly as indicative of an anti-engineering attitude according to which the discipline of IS should be regarded 
mainly as a branch of the social studies, and/or according to which there are no objective procedures with which 
to arrive at statements of strong trans-subjective verisimilitude. It is this anti-engineering attitude (shown by 
example in the following paragraphs) against which we advocate the epistemology and methodology of 
engineering as the appropriate philosophy for the discipline of IS and its research activities. 
In (Walsham 1995a) it was declared that there are three types of realism, namely 'external realism' which 
considers reality as existing independently of our construction of it, 'internal realism' which views reality-for-us 
as an inter-subjective construction of the shared human cognitive apparatus, and 'subjective idealism' where 
everybody is considered to construct his own reality. Moreover, according to (Walsham 1995a), the 'usual' 
ontological stance for an interpretive IS researcher would involve one of the latter two positions, particularly 
with regard to the human interpretations and meanings associated with computer systems. The paper was highly 
influential with more than 2230 citations so far. The same story continued in (Walsham 1995b) according to 
which interpretive methods of research adopt the position that our knowledge of reality is a social construction 
by human actors, whereby value-free data cannot be obtained. Such 'interpretivism' is opposed to the so-called 
'positivism' wherein it is assumed that the objective data collected by the researcher can be used to test prior 
hypotheses or theories. In other words: 'interpretivism' excludes itself from the realm of science in which all 
hypotheses must be amenable for confirmation or refutation by empirical or by logical means. Moreover, 
according to (Walsham 1995b), the claim that interpretivism is a valid approach to research on IS in 
organizations has penetrated the mainstream IS community to the extent that it is taken seriously at least in 
written material which discusses research methodology – in other words: the damage has indeed been done, and 
we are not merely discussing an insignificant 'red herring' at this point. Also [Wal95] was highly influential with 
more than 800 citations so far. 
The same topic was picked up again in a much-used IS methodology textbook (Oates 2006), in which we can 
find that the shared worldview of those who work in the interpretivist paradigm has the following 
characteristics. Multiple subjective realities: there is no single version of  the truth. What we take to be 'real' or 
'knowledge' is a construction of our minds, either individually or in a group. Moreover, the scientific method 
itself is a social construction, developed by a community of researchers over several hundred years as the 'right' 
way to do research (Oates 2006) – whereby the word 'right' appeared derogatively between apostrophes, thus 
diminishing 400 years of scientific achievements, without any explanation about why such an allegedly 'merely 
constructed' method was so useful that it was actually able to survive over several hundred years (without having 
been given up again as useless after its first few decades). Also (Oates 2006) had considerable influence with 
more than 400 citations up to now. 
More recently (Kroeze 2010) presented for the discipline of IS an enumeration of various features of 
postmodernism and described the typical effects of the rise of postmodernism in IS. According to (Kroeze 2010), 
while IS research in the USA tends to be more positivist, believing that there is a single reality and truth, IS 
research in Europe is more interpretivist, using the point of departure of many realities. With reference to the 
above-mentioned book (Oates 2006) it was postulated in (Kroeze 2010) that interpretive studies try to 
understand a pluralistic world based on the principle that people assign meanings and values to their unique 
contexts, whereby it should be noted that Oates herself does not typify interpretivism as postmodern, but the 
following traits clearly point in this direction. The acceptance of the idea of multiple subjective realities and 
dynamic, socially constructed meaning, e.g. how different IT company cultures experience truth and knowledge 
and methodologies, is part and parcel of the interpretivist paradigm (Kroeze 2010). 
In (Stahl 2013) we can find an extremist polemic which aims at exorcising even the last few remaining traits of 
empirism out of the doctrine of 'interpretivism': using quality criteria of different research streams related to 
interpretivism, the paper compares the role of empirical data in different types of research accounts with fairy 
tales (sic!), noting that interpretive IS research shares at least as many quality features with fairy tales as with 
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positivist narratives.3 Moreover, (Stahl 2013) argues that Walsham's position –see above: (Walsham 1995a) 
(Walsham 1995b)–represents core elements of current interpretive IS research, some of which are problematic 
because they are based on empiricist assumptions that are inconsistent with the philosophical roots of 
interpretivism – which itself is inconsistent, by the way, with the official doctrine of pluralism and 'multiple 
realities' amongst the disciples of postmodernism. All in all, (Stahl 2013) aims to be contrarian by questioning 
the foundations of empiricism in interpretivism, whereby the argument is that interpretivism renounces the idea 
of objectivity of research, and reinterprets the act of doing research as the development of useful narratives. 
According to this ideology of IS, researchers are storytellers (sic!) who construct arguments to help their 
audience understand a particular point (Stahl 2013). Whereas such a view might be heretical to a traditional 
objectivist and positivist position, it is consistent with the philosophical tenets of interpretivism (Stahl 2013) – or, 
in simpler words: pseudo-science was elevated by (Stahl 2013) to the esteemed status of proper science in a 
quasi Orwellian 'newspeak' act. Last but not least it is also revealing to look at Table 1 on page 8 of (Stahl 2013) 
wherein different research paradigms (and fairy tales!) were compared against each other: the engineering of 
useful and reliable IT devices –i.e.: the most important part and purpose of the IS discipline– was not even 
mentioned in that table. 
In (Koskosas 2013) we can find an overview of various approaches to the recently upcoming topic of 
information systems' security (ISS). In that context (Koskosas 2013) also reported the existence of 
'interpretivism', according to which the interpretivist paradigm approaches do not approach their studies from 
an objective point of view, but are more concerned with the subjective meaning that people attribute to their 
social situations, whereby they look at the world through 'nominalism',4 assuming that the world is constructed 
from names, concepts and labels that are used to structure reality (Koskosas 2013). Moreover, interpretive 
research within the tradition of phenomenology is concerned with the description and analysis of everyday life, 
whereby a phenomenological disposition involves giving up the natural science attitude and its assumptions 
(Koskosas 2013) – see, however, (Bochenski 1954) for a more detailed characterisation of the phenomenological 
method. Thereafter (Koskosas 2013) listed many papers and authors who attempted to introduce such 
interpretivist, radical 'humanist', as well as radical 'structuralist' paradigms into information systems' security 
(ISS) – all of them variants of 'sociologism' in the broadest sense of the term. 
Most recently also (Tsang 2014) provided a comparative overview of different 'paradigms' co-existing in IS 
research, whereby the so-called 'positivism', 'interpretivism', as well as critical realism were compared. The 
explicit differentiation between the so-called 'positivism' and critical realism (i.e.: the train of science-
philosophical thought after Popper) is of particular interest at this point, since the School of Frankfurt had falsely 
conflated critical realism with 'positivism' in the Positivismusstreit of German sociology (Adorno et al. 1972). 
With regard to interpretivism, (Tsang 2014) asserted its existence in the discipline of IS and explicated that 
unlike positivism, interpretivism considers the methods of natural science inadequate for conducting social 
science research. While the natural sciences seek to explain non-intentional phenomena, the job of the social 
sciences is to understand intentional phenomena by interpreting the meanings attached to the phenomena by 
their actors (Tsang 2014). Moreover, viewing reality as socially constructed, interpretivists adopt a relativist 
stance (Tsang 2014): here is the 'smoking gun' that we were seeking. Also in (Tsang 2014) we can find evidence 
of the predominance of the old-fashioned and out-dated conflict between the natural-scientific and the 
sociologist 'paradigms' in IS, though (Tsang 2014) has not completely forgotten the engineering aspects in IS 
research: they were classified in (Tsang 2014) into the critical realist 'paradigm'. 
AN EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF ENGINEERING FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF IS 
IS research is neither pure science, nor philosophy, nor sociology. IS research belongs to the domain of the 
applied sciences which are closely related to the practice of engineering as well as the engineering sciences 
which support the practice of engineering theoretically and systematically. We conjecture that the ideological 
doctrines of relativism in the discipline of IS can only lead the community of IS researchers into a cul-de-sac in 
which technical improvements and innovations do no longer have any philosophical or methodological 
foundations, and in which the technical qualities of IT devices, including their possibly dangerous mal-
functioning, cannot be reliably assessed beyond merely conventional 'I like' or 'I dislike' opinions any more. 
Standing on such an unstable philosophical basis, IT practitioners could never achieve the trustworthy status of 
'certified professionals' by any serious chamber of commerce, and would also not be able to defend themselves 
before a court of justice in case that anything goes wrong with their devices. Still we believe –somewhat 
optimistically– that even the ideologically most hard-boiled interpretivist-relativist-culturalist IS 'philosopher' 
3 'narrative' ≈ 'tale' or 'story' 
4 The meaning of the term 'nominalism' in that reference is not the same as the historic meaning of 'nominalism' in the context 
of the metaphysical dispute about the existence or non-existence of universals as ontic entities since the medieval-scholastic 
philosophy up to Quine. 
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would eventually wake up from his dogmatic slumber (Kant), if he would notice one morning that a mal-
functioning banking software system would have irreversibly emptied his bank account via the internet, such that 
our multiple-realities relativist would now be penniless and would have to queue up at his municipality's social 
welfare office to obtain his daily bread without being able to construct for himself an alternative 'subjective 
reality' in which the IT system error did not happen and in which he still has got some money in his bank 
account. We do not doubt that in such an extreme situation even the most radical multiple-realities-relativist 
would be begin to agree that such a mal-functioning banking information system would have been badly 
engineered. 
A Brief Sketch of Engineering according to Vincenti 
From a number of historical case studies involving pilots (i.e.: humans), their aeroplanes (i.e.: devices), as well 
as device-qualities which are hard to quantify (e.g.: fly-ability) in (Vincenti 1990), the following seven steps of a 
general engineering workflow can be extracted. It is easy to see that these seven steps include, comprise and 
combine features which postmodernist IS philosophers had hitherto contrasted as so-called 'positivist', 
respectively 'interpretivist', against each other – now they are integrated into one and the same methodological 
framework which differs from the 'pure' scientific method in a number of points (Vincenti 1990): 
1. The engineer familiarises himself with the given situation and recognises a problem. 
2. The engineer identifies the basic 'variables' of the problem (which are amenable for modification in 
search for optimisation), and derives analytical concepts (models) as well as assessment criteria for 
them. 
3. The engineer develops suitable means of instrumentation and techniques of measurement and system-
manipulation. 
4. The engineer communicates with the users in order to assess their opinion about the qualities of the 
implemented devices. 
5. The engineer combines results and insights from steps 1-4 into a practice-oriented research project on 
the given matter. 
6. The engineer measures relevant characteristics, whereby the choice of measurements is also informed 
by the criteria of above. 
7. The engineer assesses all results from steps 1-6 to arrive at a well-grounded and implementable 
specification for the design and production of new devices. 
In this scheme of engineering, communicative interaction with the users shall ensure that the to-be-engineered 
devices meet their purposes, whereas objective measurements and tests shall ensure that the to-be-engineered 
devices are reliable, trustworthy, and technically sound. Following such a professional method accurately to the 
best of knowledge, available in the standardised engineering handbooks, the engineer can also defend himself 
effectively in front of a court of justice if any unforeseeable technical accident with his devices is happening. 
Within an engineering workflow on the basis of (Vincenti 1990) as outlined above, a number of epistemic 
categories and knowledge-producing activities can be identified, inluding: 
• design concepts, 
• models and theories, 
• practical considerations and human purposes, 
• instruments and quantitative data, 
• science-to-application transfer, 
• explorative as well as hypothesis-testing experimentation, 
• invention and innovation, 
• industrial production. 
In this multi-dimensional epistemic field, the engineer's knowledge is partly descriptive (objective), partly 
prescriptive (normative) and partly also tacit (including personal experiences, spontaneous intuitions, as well as 
the proverbial 'secrets of the trade' which are never made explicit and which are hard to quantify). The engineer's 
knowledge is thus partly idiographic (i.e.: similar to the hermeneutical concepts of 'understanding' in the 
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humanities) as well as partly nomothetic (i.e.: similar to the law-like concepts of 'explanation' in the natural 
sciences), whereby particular features of crafts (pre-scientific) and science (theoretical) are combined in practice. 
The considerations of (Vincenti 1990) are consistent with the 'classical' demarcation between science and 
technology provided by (Arageorgis et al. 1989), whilst the latest fancy-fashion of the so-called 'design science' 
(Alturki et al. 1972) merely attaches a modish new label to well-established technical or engineering activities,5 
and is thus covered by (Vincenti 1990), too. 
Relevance and Implications of Vincenti for the Software- and Information Systems Producing Disciplines 
Amongst several others it was particularly Maibaum who has made insights from (Vincenti 1990) fruitful for the 
family of software-producing disciplines to which IS belongs. Out of Maibaum's many publications to this end, 
(Maibaum 2000) was chosen as the main basis for our concluding arguments – though very similar 
considerations were expressed independently of (Vincenti 1990) and (Maibaum 2000) also in the German 
informatics community (Broy et al. 1999), which is deeply rooted in the long and rich tradition of German 
engineering, and in which the IS-related development and operation of large systems of digital information 
processing and communication has been classified into the category of 'systems and software engineering' on the 
social premises that 'information' is nowadays regarded as a commercially and economically relevant 'resource' 
or 'ware' (Broy et al. 1999). 
An important consequence from (Vincenti 1990) is a conceptual distinction between 'normal' and 'radical' 
engineering on the one hand, and a related distinction between 'devices' and 'systems' on the other hand. In terms 
of (Maibaum 2000), a device is an entity the design principles of which are well defined, well structured, and 
subject to normal design principles. A system, the subject of radical design, is an assembly of devices brought 
together for a collective purpose in such a manner that it is not amenable for normal design. In software, 
examples of 'devices' include compilers, operating systems, or relational data bases, whereas air traffic control 
systems or mobile telephone networks could be mentioned as examples of 'systems'. As the engineering discipline 
progresses, 'systems' can become 'devices' when their design attains the status of being 'normal', i.e.: the level of 
creativity required in their design becomes one of textbook-based choices, based on standard definitions and 
professionally agreed criteria. In other words: whereas science progressively seeks 'revolutions' for the sake of 
radically new knowledge, engineering conservatively seeks 'standardisation' for the sake of reliable and 
predictable success in practice. Such standardisation, however, can only be achieved through specialisation and 
differentiation into well-understood domains and sub-domains – in the field of applied IS for example: the 
public-health-domain, the E-commerce domain, the E-learning domain, etc. Neither software engineering nor IS 
have yet achieved this much-needed sub-domain-specialisation. As a direct consequence of this lack, the typical 
development processes in almost all SE/IS projects are still chaotic, error-prone, and hampered by ignorance. 
(For comparison the reader may imagine a technical environment in which we had only some unspecific 
'hardware engineering' without any sub-domain specialisation into civil engineering, railway engineering, 
electrical engineering, or chemical engineering, in which the steady evolution and small-step-improvement of 
devices is now a matter of course.) 
According to (Maibaum 2000) the terminology of software engineering is characterised by a number of '-ility' 
words –for example: 'reliability'– which typically belong to a class of end-user-oriented, informal or semi-
scientific concepts which bedevil the subject itself as well as the lawyers when terms and conditions of contracts 
between customer and provider are at stake. Not particularly interesting from the perspective of 'pure' science –
see for example Dijkstra's famous distinction between correctness problems and mere 'pleasantness problems' in 
(Dijkstra 1986)– those  '-ility' properties are, though hard to quantify, at the heart of engineering praxis in the 
day-to-day activities of normal design. The problem with those '-ilities' is that they are dispositions, i.e.: 
theoretical properties that are not immediately observable though they have, ultimately, observational 
consequences. Many and varied and specialised in-the-small-theories to support engineering-design are thus 
needed, particularly for representing the '-ility' properties in a systematic manner. As far as the theoretical or 
intellectual 'tools' from (Vincenti 1990) are concerned, a better general understanding of the principles of 
modularity and decomposition is particularly needed for all software-producing disciplines (Maibaum 2000) 
(because modularity is the only feasible way of coping with the confusing complexity of very large information 
systems), as well as useful data-collections (handbook-style) from past observations onto which future design-
decisions can be based with high confidence. 
Those readers, who are familiar with the out-dated 'positivism-versus-interpretivism' quarrel in the meta-IS 
discourse, will have noticed that the so-called 'positivism' and 'interpretivism' are so tightly interwoven that they 
5 Is the so-called 'design science' a science about how to design something? – then it is an engineering science. Is 'design 
science' a science which uses designs or designed things for the purpose of achieving knowledge or other goals? – then it is 
no different from the majority of sciences which are already known to us since the end of the Middle Ages. 
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cannot be separated from each other in a methodological framework of proper engineering. For example: whilst 
it might well be up to interpretation how much mean time between failures (MTBF) ought to be allowed for an 
information system to be still regarded as 'reliable' in a particular social context of usage (e.g.: in a digital library, 
or in e-commerce), there is no more room for interpretation as soon as an empirical test has objectively revealed 
that two failures have occurred at times t and t', with |t' – t| < |MTBF|. In such a case, the information system 
under observation must be regarded as unreliable. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have shown that the so-called 'positivism-versus-interpretivism' quarrel, which had been un-
necessarily made up by various socio-constructivist postmodernists in the discipline of IS, is actually a pseudo-
problem. We have dissolved this pseudo-problem by showing that (and how) IS research belongs to the domain 
of engineering (Broy et al. 1999) which already possesses its firmly established methodology and epistemology 
(Vincenti 1990). This engineering methodology and epistemology combines a trinity of scientific-nomothetic, 
hermeneutic-idiographic, as well as pragmatic-normative features, in which the fruitless 'positivism-
interpretivism'-opposition is dissolved. From the fact that we can recognise various aspects of reality (when 
beheld from various points) we cannot infer the existence of a multiplicity of 'realities'. As far as the discipline of 
IS is concerned, which is dedicated to the science-based engineering (i.e.: design and installation) of inter-
subjectively trustworthy and objectively reliable information systems (devices), the following three law-like 
constraints prohibit any further speculations about IS research being an instance of 'story-telling' (or any other 
pseudo-scientific absurdities): 
1. It is impossible to construct any 'reality' in which the operations of computer-based information systems 
do not need energy. 
2. It is impossible to construct any 'reality' in which the point-to-point transmission of information through 
a lossy channel (such as the internet) is not limited by Shannon's channel capacity theorem. 
3. It is impossible to construct any 'reality' in which the halting problem of Turing machines is decidable. 
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